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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT£ OF UTAH

BEVERLY LARSEN and the STATE
OF UTAH, by and through Utah
Stabe Department of Social
Services,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 14593

- v EARNEST LARSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE MATURE OF T^E CASE
Appellants, State of Utah and Beverly Larsen, appeal
fro- an order of the lower court which dismissed a request
for judgment on an order to show cause that denied appellant, State of Utah, all right to reimbursement for support
payments* given respondent's children since the entry of a
$1.00 support order.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The lower court held that the $1.00 per year child
support order was in fact a valid "order of support1' and
that the state was not entitled to the Reasonable amount of
support for money tendered by the state for care of the respondentfs children whether or not the [respondent's

circumstances had changed, and that that had to be done
prospectively only.

The court gave leave for the state to

refile the order to show cause to correct flaws which would
allow a modification for a new support order but outrightly
dismissed the state's attempt to collect anything since the
divorce order to that point of time.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's
order that a one dollar ($1.00) per year support order is
an order of support and seek

this court to declare the

same void from its inception.

Further, the appellants seek

this court to direct the lower court to hold a hearing to
establish what the respondent's liability for support has
been sirce the entry of the order of $1.00, with directions
to grant judgment for the amount so declared up to and including the $50 per month per child as requested in the
state's order to show cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The co-plaintiff, Beverly Larsen, was awarded a
decree of divorce from defendant in May of 1967.

(R. 24-25)

Care, custody and control of the parties' three minor children was awarded to the co-plaintiff, subject to reasonable
rights of visitation by the defendant.

Because of an ill-

ness and physical disability from which defendant then
suffered, and by reason of emotional problems suffered by

-2-

the children as a result of defendant's prior conduct,
the visitation rights of defendant were limited.

In addi-

tion, defendant was ordered to pay one dollar ($1.00)
per year alimony and one dollar ($1.00) per year child support for the three children.

The support orders were,

however, subject to review and modification by the court,
as the circumstances of the defendant became such that he
should be required to pay additional amounts for support.
Because of defendant's failure to provide support,
defendant's wife and children were forced to rely upon public assistance from April, 1972, througn January, 197 6.
An a^signrent of collection was execute^ on September 17,
19~A„ pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9, by which
plaincir:

rights to support for herself and her children

were subrc-rated to those of the Department of Social Services.
A hearing was held on plaintiffs1 order to show
cause on April 16, 197 6, ro determine why the child support provision of the divorce decree should not be modified
upwards and why a judgment for the reasonable amount of
support from April, 1972, through February, 1976, based on
the rate of fifty dollars ($50.00) per Jtionth per child,
should not be entered against defendant for accrued and
unpaid child support payments totaling six thousand seven
hundred and seventeen dollars ($6,717.0Q).

-3-

The state made an attempt to bring to the court's
attention the fact of changed circumstances since the entry
of the order, as well as the contention that the $1.00 order
is in fact no order of support.

The lower court, as per

Judge Croft, would not allow such evidence in, holding
that since the order referred to was in fact an order of
support, the state was not entitled to a retroactive determination of liability and, therefore, the only matter the
court could consider was present changed circumstances for
prospective support only.

The court held the order to show

cause deficient for the prospective hearing but gave leave
to ccinsel for the state to refile for that matter only.
Frcn rhis decision, the state appeals,
POINT I
THE DIVORCE DECREE SUPPORT ORDER DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER OF SUPPORT AND WAS AN
A3USE OF THE LOWER COURT'S DISCRETION.
The sum of one dollar ($1.00) per year for the
support of three (3) children, which the district court
ordered in the divorce decree and which the lower court,
through Judge Bryant H. Croft, affirmed, from which this
appeal is brought, was void from its inception.

A child

support order requires that an existing need be met.

In

the present case, no need v/as met at the time of the decree
and no need has been met.

In essence, the lower court has

put its stamp of approval on "non-support" instead of support.
-4-

As stated in the early case of Gould v. City of
Lawrence, 160 Mass. 232, 35 N.E. 462 (1893), "the word
1

support1 is often used in our statutes, and in its ordi-

nary signification it includes not merely board, but everything necessary to proper maintenance."

And, in Snyder v.

Lane, 135 W. Va. 887, 65 S,E.2d 483 (1951):

"the words

'maintenance1 and 'support1 are usually synoymous.

They

mean necessaries of life and means of livelihood and include,
but are not limited to, food, shelter and clothing."

Since

one dollar per year for three children equals but 2.77 cents
per child per month, this pittance not only fails to provide for the maintenance of the children, but also renders
the law farcical and meaningless.
That the duty to provide support requires a meaningful contribution on the part of an obligor father is
i

illustrated by various code provisions J Utah Code Annotated
78-45-3 (1953) states:
and his child."

"Every man sha4.1 support his wife

A "support debt," as defined in Section

78-45b-2(4), "means the debt created bf nonpayment of child
support under the laws of this state or the decree of any
court of appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be
paid as child support."

An indication of what might be re-

quired by way of support is found in Sections 78-45a-l and
78-45b-2(5).

Under Section 78-45a-l, a father is liable

" . . . for the education, necessary siipport and funeral
expenses of /his7 child."

And, under $ection 78-45b-2(5),

-5-

11

'Need1 means the necessary costs of food, clothing, shelter

and medical attendance for the support of any dependent
child."

Obviously, a valid support order must reflect and

contribute to meeting these needs of the child.
Not only were the needs of the children in the
instant case not met, but the court below clearly abused
its discretion by refusing to follow the guidelines set
forth in Section 78-45-7:
"Determination of amount of support.—
When determining amount due for support the
court shall consider all relevant factors
including but not limited to:
(1) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(2) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(4) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(5) the need of the obligee;
(6) the age of the parties;
(7) the responsibility of the obligor
for the support of others."
Though the lower court in the divorce decree made mention
of defendant's illness and physical disability, it clearly
failed to seriously consider, much less talk about, the other
relevant factors as contained in 78-45-7, e.g., the standard
of living and situation of the parties; the relative wealth
and income of said parties; the needs and ages of the obligee children, etc.

Indeed, the ridiculous sum of $1.00

should prima facie demonstrate that it did not.

Years ago,

this court set forth the basic policy to be followed in the
Utah courts.

This basic policy is found in Rees

v.

Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957), wherein the
rule of law decided upon was approved because it gave " . . .
-6-

primary consideration to the rights and needs of children."
(Emphasis added.)
Appellants are hard put to distinguish which aspect of the former order took primary concern for "the
children."

The order, in essence, made the children

paupers, having to rely on the support of the state through
public welfare instead of the father who could have paid
something.

The affidavit of the State of Utah for the orI

-

•••

• - . . . .

der to show cause hearing shows that the defendant didn't
even pay the "one dollar" per year.
To disregard the welfare of

children as evi-

denced fay -the order is an abuse of discretion of the lower
coirr-.

The state ' s attempt to collect back the reasonable

amour- of rapport for the several yeari involved goes to
mitigate this inconsistent position the court originally
took.

Too often, as here, the welfare of the children is

totally disregarded, as are the statutory duties imposed.
Equity speaks for varying amounts of support when circumstances warrant, but an order of $1.00 a year for three children is NO ORDER OF SUPPORT, and any jucjge rendering such a
decision or sanctioning such an agreement has abused the
discretion granted him to make "equitable" orders.

Such an

order of.2.77 cents per child per month is indeed not equitable.

This court, in Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commis-

sion, 83 Utah 166, 27 P.2d 434, held that a child cannot
waive support.

What right does the coijirt have of taking

that right away from the child when th^ child cannot even
-7-

do it himself?

Appellants cannot find any reason for such

logic,
POINT II
THE DUTY TO SUPPORT IS CONTINUING AND
EXISTS REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE OF A
COURT TO PROVIDE THEREFOR.
Because of appellant's intense belief that the
one dollar support order is NO ORDER OF SUPPORT, the question then arises as to appellant's right to collect for
the reasonable support that should have been paid.

The

lower court, as per Judge Croft, denied the appellant's
right to have that determined or even to have brought to
the ccurr'c attention the defendant's ability to pay more
thar: the d*xrreed order fron a change of circumstances, such
asfceccningemployed.
Therefore, it is appellant's contention, backed
by the courts of many states, that the duty to support
exists ana is continuing even when no support order (as in
this case) is entered.

Though this question is one of first

impression in this state, Justice Ellet in his comments in
the Whitaker v. l.Tiitaker No. 14329, Filed June 10, 1976,
emphasized what appellants feel is their position:
"Of course the defendant, as father of the
children, would be liable in a civil action
regardless of the lack of an order in the
decree of divorce. In fact he might be criminally liable for failing to provide for his
minor children if he was willful in that regard.11 (Emphasis added.)
This sheds some light on the fact that if the one dollar
order is not considered a "support order" liability still
-8-

exists to third parties•

Simply because a decree uses the

terms "child support" or "support order" doesn't hide the
fact that the order isn't what it purports to be.
This "meaningful contribution" to a child's care
is a continuing duty through a child*s minority and as
indicated by Utah Code Annotated 78-4542 and 3, this duty
continues until age 21, unless a court orders otherwise.
Utah case lav; reinforces the absolute and continuing nature of this duty.

In Jenkins v.[ Jenkins, 107 Utah

239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944), the court stated that the father
has a positive duty to support his minor child.

And, in

Rees v. Archibald, supra:
"This court has invariably emphasized
the father's obligation to support his children based upon zhe elementary principle
that the law imposes upon those who bring
children into the world the duty to care for
and support them during their| minority and
dependency."
The Colorado court, in Garvin v. Garviri, 108 Colo. 415, 118
P.2d 768 (1951), declared that the "primary liability of a
father to support his minor child always exists during
minority."

(Emphasis added*)
This court has recognized tha|t to take away

from a defendant the duty and obligations of support cannot
be done and to do so is void, unless permitted by the law.
In fact, the court indicated that the duty is so fundamental that "there is not vested in any court of this state
the right to make a final order relieving a father, permanently, of his obligation to support his child except
under the Adoption Statute."

Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d

-9-

878 (1958).

Though it will undoubtedly be argued that the

order in this case did not go to the extreme as Riding, Id. ,
and that a modification could have been made upon motion
to the court, the fact that Mrs. Larsen has been on public
assistance should not allow the respondent to hide behind a purported "order of support" which is void as soon
as abilities permit contribution of any degree at all.
That point was at the original hearing date despite of his
physical disabilities.

There is nothing to indicate in the

findings of fact (R-27) whether the respondent had any other
income at all.

Nonetheless, he has willfully failed to make

any atter.pt to support his children despite the circumstances
behind the technicality of the $1.00 support order.
Because of the continuing nature of this obligation, the great weight of authority holds the father liable even where the court has failed to provide for support.
In Curton v. Gordon, 510 S.W.2d 682 (Texas, 1974), that
court stated:
"The natural father has the legal
duty to support his child, even when not
ordered by the trial court to make payments."
And, in Krog v. Krog, 32 C.2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948):
"The law is established that, despite
the fact that a final decree of divorce
contains no provision for support of the
children of the parties, the court may in
supplemental proceedings in the divorce action order the husband to make payments for
that purpose. (Citations omitted.) Moreover, a child's rights in this respect cannot be barred by agreement between the
parents."
-10-

Further, in Martinez v. State, 307 S.wJ2d 259 (Texas
Criminal, 197 5), the court said, in th^ case of criminal
non-support, that:
"• . # even though the divorce decree
makes no provision for support and maintenance of the children, the father's duty
is still primary and continuing*"
In Rees v. Archibald, supra, the Utah Supreme
Court succinctly stated the Utah position:

" . . • the great

weight of authority is that a father's obligation to support
his minor children is not changed by a divorce decree which
gives the custody of the children to the wife, but does
not mention their support,"

(Emphasis added.)

Here, of course, support was mentioned, but did
the court really intend 2.77 cents a mdnth to be support?
If so, the court is placing the stamp of approval on non
support of anyone who can show he!s not working or has a
temporary illness.

Children must live J too, and it is

against public policy to encourage fathers this way out.
POINT III
IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE LOWER COURT
MAY MAKE AN ORDER OF SUPPORT SUCH AS
THAT IN THIS CASE ON A TEMPORARY BASIS,
THE RIGHT TO ENLARGED SUPPORT BEGINS AUTOMATICALLY UPON A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
NOTWITHSTANDING A COURT ORDER TO THE CONTRARY,
Though there is support in Utah law that fathers
may be temporarily relieved of the support obligation "if the
circumstances warrant," this court should require some legitimate reduction of "aid" to the children instead of permitting an over-the-board explusion of p.ny and all obligations,
-11-

If there is allowed unfettered discretion, every father
who is out of work, sick, lazy, etc., would have "good
grounds to have the support reduced as in this case.
Although it could be argued that the one dollar ($1.00)
support order was only meant to show that the court below
was aware of the defendant's support obligation and merely
intended to demonstrate that said was relieved of his support duty, this court should restrict the interpretation
on the language as given by Judge Croft.
Judge Croft held that even though there might
have been substantial and material change of circumstances
sine- the : srler

of $1.00 cf support was entered, the father-

def z- iar.i

-I no increased dut:y of support until the order

was 3.;angj

~o a larger arrount.

Further, the holding pro-

hibits rhe stare or any other third party furnishing support
the right tc collect a reasonable compensation for aid rendered even if the defendant-father had the ability to pay.
A hypothetical at this point would be helpful:
Mr. X is incapacitated from an accident and has zero income with no apparent
ability to work. An order is entered
totally relieving the defendant from his
support obligation. One year later, Mr. X
finds employment and nets $20,000 for the
year. The ex-wife does not learn of the
employment until one and one-half years
later because she has not seen Mr. X. The
court holds that even though Mr. X has had the
ability to pay substantial support for one
and one-half years, he needs not because of
the prior order.

-12-

Appellants feel that though •^he above hypothetical
might exaggerate the situation, they should have the opportunity to bring to the court's attention any change of circumstances and the date such transpired , because if the
reason for the reduction is no longer :j.n existence, the
order of the court is based on a non-existent situation*
Therefore, the lower court should be r ^quired to review the
situation to see if the ability to support came into existence some time before the hearing appealed from.

Appellants

nonetheless maintain that a one dollar ($1.00) order of supporr is no support order and are, therefor e, entitled to
have the lower court review the entire period and enter a
judgment for the reasonable amount ovezf that period of time,
Factors that would and should be evaulated are
as follows:

change in ability to earn income, new jobs,

investments, re-marriage, pensions, workmen}f s compensation,
social security, etc.

Each of these fc|ctors tend to show

what ability the father of children ha

to support.

To say

that once a $1.00 order is entered thai a father can hide
behind that "cloak" without divulging any changes to the
court is to judicially disgrace the laws of this state and
the moral duty parents should have for their children.
While this court has held, iij Riding, supra,
that no court of the state can make a fjinal order relieving the father of his obligations to su[pport except under
the adoption statute, Rockwood v. Rock^ood, 65 Utah 2 61,

-13-

236 P. 457 (1957) , has given indication that this could
temporarily do away with the obligation.

This court said:

"The duty of the father to support
his children, if he is able to do so, is
imposed in this state by positive statute."
(Emphasis added.)
Further, in Hulse v. Hulse, 111 Utah 193, 176 P.2d 875 (1947),
the court reiterated:

"...

the father has the legal duty

to support his minor child if he is able to do so."

Equity

calls for a review of circumstances, but appellants point
out that there is a wide gulf between "support" and "contribution* " Though a legitimate support order might be $100-150
per month, courts should not totally do away with the
support: obligation, as in this case, unless the facts are
so extreme as to warrant that action as the only alternative.
Appellants don?t read the above cases to say that the obligation can be done away.

These cases in equity show that if a

father cannot "support" a child or children, that if he can
contribute something towards their support, then he should.
For example, one might be able to contribute $2 0 per
month—which cannot literally be considered "support"—
but cannot pay $10 0 per month, which is a support order.
Does that mean that if one cannot pay $100 or over $50
that he should pay nothing?

NO I

IF THE FATHER CAN CON-

TRIBUTE ANYTHING, HE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO DO SO.

The $1.00

order, however, is an abuse of this equitable principle.

-14-

The reason is that equity goes both waVs.

Though it

might be equitable to relieve the father of the full support obligation, the court must look at the welfare of the
children and allow equity to look aftey their interests as
well.
The exceptions to the genera

duty of support

are summarized in 69 ALR2d, Section 2, as follows:
"An exception to the general rule
that a father is liable for the support
of a child after a divorce exists in some
states in cases where the father was unable
to pay for the support of his child at the
time it was furnished, or the circumstances
were such that if the mother had applied in
advance for a support order the court would
not have required the father to support his
child* This exception is usually recognized
in true hardship cases, where) the father has
r^en physically unable to worlk. for a long period
:J time and has little or no [property. " (Emphas is added.)
Once againf however, if the circumstancjees change from this
"physical inability to work," the whole basis for the order
of reduction ceases and the duty of support is automatically
reinstated.

The lower court should then make a determination

from that point of time onward as to wh^t the liability will
be.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Haugen v. Swanson,
222 Minn., 23 N.W.2d 535 (1946), entertained this same question and said:
"The father of a child will not be relieved
of liability to support it except where his
inability to do so clearly appears." (Emphasis
added.)

-15-

Once again, the equitable principle is clear that
if there is a time the circumstances for reduction have
changed so that it is not "clear" that the reduction should
continue, the "duty" once again arises and a court is given
authority to retroactively review the situation from that
point onward.
There are many times in divorces where personal
jurisdiction over the father is not possible*

The court

must then make an order something to the effect that the
marter of child support will be held in abeyance pending
jurisdicrior. over the father.
Cref-'s zrl„z

To take the logic of Judge

further is to say that because there was no

jur^ciicri n over the absent father, no legal or moral duty
exirt: u^i.l the decree Lz modified.
naive position to take.

This is a totally

If a court gets jurisdiction over

the abser.z father at some later date—which could be months
or years—that court has the right to make the determination
as to the father's liability while absent.

This is clear

even though a divorce decree might be silent on the matter
of support entirely.
While it is generally held that modified orders
are not given retroactive effect, equity, the welfare of
children, reimbursement to the state and other reasons all
give support to the basic view that IF A FATHER CAM SUPPORT
OR CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN, HE SHOULD BE
LIABLE THEREFOR.
-16-

That an obligor father knows of his duty of
support is clear; the obligor father al\tso knows that relief
therefrom can be effective only so long[ as he remains ill
or disabled.

The father is well aware of his own personal

condition and of any subsequent change in circumstance
which would reinstate his continuing diity. To relieve the
father of all liability after he has recovered because of
his willful failure to report his improved condition to
the court or because of lack of diligence on the part of
other parties involved would open the door to abuse and encourage fraud and irresponsibility.

A father could, for

example, be disabled for a short time, bo back to work,
earn a substantial salary and yet owe nothing merely beui

upon.

.s changed circumstance was not discovered or acted

Public policy should require that the circumstances

be considered.
A primary reason for not allowing retroactive
application of a revised court order is the possibility of
the father being ordered to pay sums wh ich would be unfair
to him.

Such a situation, however, is before the court.

The

court has the competence to know the "n beds" of children, the
"needs" of the father, and has the ability to establish
liability based on principles of fairness and justice.
Thus, given the continuing absolute nature of a
fatherfs support duty, the strong possibility of fraud and
abuse, and the fact that the state has Xittle choice but

-17-

to provide assistance and is frequently not in a position
to protect itself from acts of irresponsible individuals,
the lower court erred by not allowing the state to collect
reimbursement for sums expended in behalf of defendant's
children at least from the time of changed circumstances.
CONCLUSION
No court of this state should have the right to
reduce the support obligation to 2.7 cents per child per
month.

To do so mocks the very principles upon which our

society is based—responsibility.
This court should hold void the $1.00 support
order as being no order at all and remand the case to the
lower court for a determination of what liability the defendant-respondent has since the entry of the order.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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